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Models of rational addiction suggest that obesity is consistent with time-consistent preferences. 
Behavioral economists maintain that addictions such as alcoholism, smoking and over-eating 
represent examples of present-bias in decision making that is fundamentally irrational. In this 
article, conduct an experiment to test whether individual discount schedules are time-consistent 
and whether discount rates are higher for subjects who exhibit patterns of risky behavior. Our 
results show that discount functions are quasi-hyperbolic in shape, and that obesity and drinking 
are positively related to the discount rate. Anti-obesity policy, therefore, would be best directed 
to informing individuals as to the long-term implications of short-term gratiﬁcation, rather than 
taxing foods directly. 
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Introduction 
Genetic arguments notwithstanding (Shell, 2002), obese individuals appear to make systematically 
different food choices relative to others. Understanding why obese people make different choices is 
essential to developing a reasoned policy approach to obesity. Most of the recent research on obesity 
in the economics literature relies on the assumption that both obese and non-obese individuals are 
rational economic decision makers. Framed in terms of the household production models of Becker 
(1965) and Becker and Stigler (1977), food consumption decisions that appear to be excessive over 
time are nonetheless thought to be the result of rational time allocation and goods consumption 
decisions (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro, 2003; Chou, Grossman, and Saffer, 2004; Philipson and 
Posner, 1999). Cawley (1999), for example, uses the rational addiction model to show that what 
appears to be overconsumption of calories can be consistent with optimal economic behavior, even 
in a dynamic model of behavior that would otherwise be considered to be pathological.1 
An alternative view of individual choices with long-term health implications has emerged in 
the behavioral economics literature (Thaler, 1981; Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1997; Shapiro, 2005). 
Speciﬁcally, if individual decisions are made with a “present bias” or preference for immediate 
gratiﬁcation, then the future costs of obesity are not likely to be appropriately balanced against the 
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1 Rational addiction models have been used to explain many types of seemingly irrational behavior, from addiction 
to cigarettes (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy, 1994), alcohol (Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan, 1998; Waters and 
Sloan, 1995), cocaine (Chaloupka, 1991), caffeine (Olekalns and Bardsley, 1996), heroin (Bretteville-Jensen, 1999) and 
food (Cawley, 1999; Richards, Patterson, and Tegene, 2007). Addiction can be rational under a condition called “adjacent 
complementarity,” which stipulates that a consumer is more likely to use a product if s/he has used that particular product 
when last confronted with a choice among it and other available alternatives. Adjacent complementarity implies that the 
increment to utility a consumer experiences from consuming more of the addictive good rises in the amount consumed in the 
past, an intertemporal property that allows addicted consumers to formulate choices in present periods that account for the 
future cost of addiction in relation to the current beneﬁt received. 
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present beneﬁts of consuming food, or avoiding the gym. Such behavior occurs if preferences are 
time-inconsistent. 
Models of rational addiction, on the other hand, assume individuals exhibit time-consistent 
preferences, that is, a decision at time t between consuming at time t + 2 or  t + 3 does not change 
when time t + 2 actually arrives. Conversely, time-inconsistent preferences arise if an individual 
exhibits what Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) refer to as a “common difference effect,” when the 
individual prefers receiving $100 today to $101 tomorrow but prefers $101 a year and a day from 
now to $100 in exactly one year.2 Time-inconsistency can arise if an individual’s discount function 
is hyperbolic, that is, if values at distant future dates are discounted at lower rates than near-term 
values (Ainslie, 1992; Ainslie and Haslam, 1992; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1997). 
Behavioral evidence suggests that individuals may have hyperbolic discount functions, for 
instance it is not uncommon for respondents in a lab setting to weight present values over those 
in the near future, while differentiating little between values at different points in the more distant 
future.3 We use an experimental framework to examine whether time preferences are indeed time 
consistent, and whether subjects who exhibit patterns of risky behavior are likely to discount the 
future more heavily than others. 
Many researchers argue that present bias may, in fact, be driven by some other underlying 
mechanism. Becker and Mulligan (1997) derive a theoretical model of intertemporal preference in 
which discount rates are endogenous in the sense that they depend on “. . . resources spent imagining 
the future. . . ”  (p.  734) or investments in better understanding the future implications of current 
behavior. By investing more, or achieving better health in the current context, an agent may better 
appreciate future rewards and, thereby, discount them less heavily. Becker and Mulligan (1997) 
maintain that their model is not inconsistent with a constant underlying rate of time preference, but 
Gafni (1995) and Bleichrodt and Gafni (1996) question the logical basis of constant discount rate 
models, arguing instead that discount rates are inherently variable. 
Evidence of hyperbolic discounting is mixed in empirical studies. Rubinstein (2003) presents 
a series of experiments in which he shows that choices among pairs of outcomes can lead to a 
pattern of behavior that rejects both exponential and hyperbolic discounting. Harrison and Lau 
(2005), on the other hand, argue that the appearance of hyperbolic discounting is merely the result 
of experimental procedures that fail to account for a front-end delay, or pairs of awards that include 
an option that is near in time, but not instantaneous. Similarly, Andersen et al. (2008) ﬁnd that if 
risk aversion is appropriately considered, and a front-end delay is included in the payoffs, then there 
is little support for hyperbolic discount functions. When they include a ﬁxed-cost associated with 
future rewards, Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010) also reject hyperbolic discounting. 
There may be other explanations for the appearance of hyperbolic-like discount schedules. 
Zauberman et al. (2008) argue instead that discrepancies among individuals’ perceptions of duration 
relative to actual duration give discount functions the appearance of being hyperbolic. In subjective 
time, they argue, discount functions are still exponential. Subadditivity, the idea that discount rates 
are greater over shorter periods, added together, than over longer delays, may also explain the 
appearance of hyperbolic discounting (Read and Read, 2004). In this research, we account for a 
number of potential forms of present-bias in testing for the effect of behavioral choices (excessive 
drinking, smoking, over-eating or obesity) on time preferences in an experimental setting. 
2 Gruber and Köszegi (2001) show that apparently addictive behavior can be explained by consumers’ time-inconsistent 
preferences. Thaler (1981) also ﬁnds that the magnitude of the values offered at different time periods can cause similar 
preference reversals. 
3 See Frederick, O’Donoghue, and Loewenstein (2002) for a review of the experimental literature on estimating discount 
rates, and documentation of the number and variety of studies which that have found evidence of hyperbolic discounting. 
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Background on Present Bias and Health
 
Several recent studies investigate the relationships among discount rates, present-bias and health 
status. We would expect that people in poor health, or who engage in activities that shorten their 
expected life-spans, to have higher discount rates. Both the expectation of an early demise and 
impulsive behavior may be causes of their poor health (e.g., overeating and obesity, smoking and 
lung disease, etc.). Hence, we expect a strong relationship between the rate of time preference and 
measures of health status over which the respondent has control. Using survey data from a sample of 
residents in Durban, South Africa, Chao et al. (2007) ﬁnd an inverse-U shaped relationship between 
discount rates and health—those in very poor health or very good health have high discount rates 
relative to those in only average health. Kirby et al. (2002) conduct a ﬁeld experiment with members 
of the Tsimane’ native tribe in the rain forest of Bolivia. They ﬁnd that discount rates are higher for 
older people and lower for the less educated, and more wealthy, but they did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant 
relationship between the rate of time preference and wealth, BMI, or drug use. Read and Read 
(2004) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between the rate of time preference and health status, but use 
very general measures for whether individuals considered themselves to be in either good or poor 
health. Tu et al. (2004), however, ﬁnd a positive relationship between BMI and the rate of discount, 
implying that more obese respondents are more likely to be impatient. In this study, we also seek to 
examine whether risky health behaviors, particular over-eating, are related to subjects’ rate of time 
preference. Unlike previous studies, however, we allow for heterogeneity in discount rates and a 
speciﬁcation that admits a number of forms of present-bias. 
Present-bias has important implications for policies designed to address not only obesity, but 
smoking, drinking, gambling, the failure to invest for retirement (Laibson, 1997), environmental 
degradation (Karp, 2005) or other long-term decisions that seem to favor present gratiﬁcation over 
long-term utility. With respect to obesity, if individuals behave according to some form of time-
inconsistent model, then they are likely to make food choices today that exhibit a strong present-
bias, leaning toward instant gratiﬁcation while not fully considering the future costs on equal 
terms, as the rational addiction model would imply. The two alternative addiction models yield 
starkly different policy implications. If an individual is rationally addicted, then addiction can be 
ameliorated by increasing future healthcare costs associated with the addiction. If, however, the 
individual discounts future costs non-exponentially, then the increases in future costs to prevent 
addiction can be prohibitive. Incentives, in the latter case, would need to emphasize immediate 
rewards for individuals who abandon their addiction. 
Experiment Design 
We investigate the nature of subjects’ discount schedules—whether they are hyperbolic and whether 
discount rates vary among individuals engaging in risky behaviors—by conducting a time-value 
elicitation experiment in a sample of eighty-two students at Arizona State University, each of whom 
provided ﬁfty time-value preference observations. The experiment follows Benhabib, Bisin, and 
Schotter (2010) in adopting the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), or BDM, method of reward-
time value elicitation. The rules of the experiment were explained to the subjects, both verbally and 
through written instructions, before the start of the experiment, practice scenarios prior to handing 
out the reward-time value elicitation instrument (see the details of the experimental method and the 
instrument in the appendix). All subjects were presented with a series of questions designed to assess 
the extent of present-bias in choosing ﬁnancial rewards over varying time periods. 
Using a BDM mechanism is intended to ensure truthful value elicitation.4 The mechanics of 
the BDM procedure were carefully explained to the students, including the fact that it is incentive 
4 The incentive compatibility of the BDM mechanism has been questioned by Horowitz (2006), among others. We assume 
that the argument advanced there, that the agent’s willingness-to-pay depends on the distribution of future values, is of minor 
consequence. 
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compatible, or in their best interests to report their true indifference amounts. Subjects were provided 
the incentive to respond with their true values during each round of the experiment. They were asked 
to respond to indifference amounts for ﬁfty different reward-time pairs (two rounds of twenty-ﬁve 
questions). One pair in each round was chosen at random to determine the payment. For example, 
assume the random reward-time pair represents a payment of $10 in four weeks. The agent’s task 
is to respond with an amount that he or she is indifferent between receiving today and the $10 
in four weeks. A random value was then drawn between $0 and $10. If the subject’s indifference 
amount, say $8, is more than the random draw, they have to wait four weeks to receive the $10. 
If the indifference amount is less than the random draw, they are paid their bid immediately. With 
this mechanism, subjects can ensure that they are paid immediately by offering $0 and that they are 
paid in four weeks by bidding $10. Therefore, they have an incentive to bid their true indifference 
amount to avoid taking the money now if they state a value that is too low (high implicit rate of time 
preference) or in the future if they state a value that is too high (low implicit rate of time preference). 
All indifference amounts, or “bids,” were submitted using standard pen-and-paper response 
instruments. Each subject’s response was then recorded, their payment calculated, and the data 
submitted to a database for further processing. Because discount rates are theoretically subject-
independent, monetary rewards should be sufﬁcient to elicit discount rates. That is, there should 
not be different discount rates for different items to be received at various points in time. To test 
whether our data exhibit a signiﬁcant “magnitude effect,” we varied the amounts involved within 
each round (Thaler, 1981; Green, Myerson, and McFadden, 1997). The amounts were $1.00, $5.00, 
$10.00, $50.00 and $100.00 to be received at various points in the future. Separate questions were 
asked for each time period in: (1) one day, (2) one week, (3) four weeks, (4) six months, and (3) in 
one year. The same subjects were asked to bid on each reward-time pair in the same session. The 
questions in the ﬁrst round were phrased as follows: “. . . what amount of money, $x, if paid to you 
today would make you indifferent to being paid $y ($1.00, $5.00, $10.00, $50.00, $100.00) in (one 
day, one week, four weeks, six months, one year)?. . . ”  
In the second round, we test for a “framing” effect by reversing the questions so that the subjects 
were asked to state a future amount that would make them indifferent between that amount and 
a ﬁxed amount today: “. . . what amount of money, $x, would you require to make you indifferent 
between receiving $y ($1.00, $5.00, $10.00, $50.00, $100.00) today and $x in (one day, one week, 
four weeks, six months, one year)?” The subjects, therefore, submit $x bids in order to receive an 
amount $y today. The amount of each $x bid was capped for each question at some upper bound 
and the BDM mechanism is applied as in the ﬁrst round. Hence, a random value was drawn between 
$0.00 and the upper limit for $x for the chosen payoff reward-time pair (which is communicated 
clearly to all subjects beforehand) and all indifference amounts less than the random value were 
paid immediately. An indifference amount more than the random value resulted in the ﬁxed amount 
being paid after the relevant time period for that round. Asking isomorphic questions in a different 
way is used to test for the potential of framing effects that are common in other experimental time 
preference studies (Frederick, O’Donoghue, and Loewenstein, 2002). As in the ﬁrst round, we are 
conﬁdent that the subjects understood the task, their incentive to respond truthfully, and the fact that 
they would be paid for doing so.5 
Rounds one and two were designed to capture basic reward-time pair data for the sample 
participants that allow us to ﬁt discount functions for each individual using an appropriate panel-
data estimator. Using these data, we test whether subjects’ responses ﬁt the exponential, quasi-
hyperbolic or some other functional form and, moreover, test whether individuals with differing 
socioeconomic, health, or behavior attributes are more or less likely to discount in ways described 
by the quasi-hyperbolic discount function. 
5 While our procedure allows us to control for framing and magnitude effects, we did not vary the order in which the 
present (future) amounts were presented to the subjects. Our results, therefore, may reﬂect an unknown amount of "ordering 
bias” if a magnitude effect does indeed exist. 
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Econometric Model of Hyperbolic Discounting
 
Several discount function speciﬁcations, D(y, t), nest the hyperbolic and exponential discounting 
models. The most general of these also allow for the inclusion of a ﬁxed-cost component, risk 
aversion, and demographic effects in either or both the discount rate, and curvature of the discount 
function. With data on only the reward-time pairs and demographic attributes of each respondent, 
however, it is difﬁcult to identify all of these effects in a single model.6 Therefore, we sacriﬁce 
generality for parsimony and robustness in estimation and adopt a general model proposed by Prelec 
(2004), while allowing for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as in Andersen et al. (2008). We 
estimate the discount function using panel data methods. Because individual-level discount functions 
are likely to contain a large amount of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate 
this model using a random parameters speciﬁcation in which the discount rate depends on a set 
of demographic and behavioral variables, as well as a purely random effect. This allows for tests 
of whether observed individual-level attributes have a signiﬁcant positive or negative impact on 
discount rates. As such, the econometric model can be used to test the hypotheses developed in 
Becker and Mulligan (1997). 
In its most general form, therefore, the econometric model is written as: 
r r h r r(1) xh = yhD(y,z , t;δh,rh,α,β ) = yhτ(exp(−δhtα )− β /yh)φ(εh), 
where xh is the promised payment for the particular question for subject h, yh is the subject’s 
indifference amount (bid), D is the discount function, t is the number of days over which the 
subject is being asked to discount (deﬁned as a proportion of a year), zh is a vector of subject 
attributes, δh is the discount rate, r is the risk aversion parameter, τ is a variable-cost component 
that determines whether the discount function is quasi-hyperbolic (τ < 1) and β is a ﬁxed-cost 
component. Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010) ﬁnd ﬁxed-costs to be the primary contributor to 
the present-bias evident in their data.7 Among the random components, the discount rate is assumed 
to reﬂect both observed and unobserved heterogeneity such that δh ∼ N(z′hδh,σδ ), while v and ε are 
unobserved random effects (vh ∼ N(μvh , σvh ), ε ∼ N(μεh ,σεh )), and β is a ﬁxed-cost component.8 If 
α = 1, the discount function is exponential and as α falls below 1.0, the function assumes more of 
a hyperbolic shape (Prelec, 2004; Andersen et al., 2008). 
Present bias will arise with this speciﬁcation, therefore, with lower values of α , higher values 
of β or r, or, of course, higher values of the underlying discount rate, δ . We also allow the agent-
speciﬁc error term, ϕ , to include a log-normally distributed error term, ε . This panel estimator is 
unlike Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010), who estimate separate models for each individual, so 
index all four parameters by h. 
We are interested in testing for systematic differences among individuals’ time preference rates 
as a function of some observable behaviors or characteristics, therefore, we assume all parameters 
are constant across individuals, except for the rate of time preference. In this way, we examine 
differences in time-preference rates over individuals, while accounting for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity, and other possible sources of present-bias. 
The primary attributes of interest are those associated with risky behaviors: smoking, drinking, 
and overeating, or its consequence, obesity. We measure drinking as the number of alcoholic 
beverages consumed per week. In general, adverse health effects are believed to be associated 
primarily with heavy drinking, as moderate drinking may have positive effects on heart disease or a 
number of other disorders (Ashley et al., 2000). Consequently, if excessive drinking reﬂects a more 
6 Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010) specify and estimate perhaps the most general empirical model, but ﬁnd that their 
nesting parameter is estimated imprecisely in nearly all speciﬁcations with individual-level models. It is not clear from their 
data how their data are able to identify the separate ﬁxed- and variable-cost effects that they report. 
7 This factor is also akin to the “. . . additive constant. . . ”  of  Becker and Mulligan (1997). 
8 Note that r = 1 implies risk neutrality and the degree of risk aversion rises as r moves away from 1.0. This is a constant 
relative risk aversion speciﬁcation (CRRA), which is a common assumption in this literature. 
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fundamental disregard for the future, we expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between the number of 
drinks per week and discount rates. Obesity is measured by the respondent’s self-reported body mass 
index (BMI).9 Despite well-reported weaknesses of BMI as a measure of obesity (Sturm), it remains 
a standard metric in the health economics literature. We expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between 
discount rates and obesity. Smoking is deﬁned as the number of cigarettes smoked per day.10 
The impact of smoking on discount rates could be either positive or negative. While smoking 
clearly poses a risk to future health, and should therefore be associated with higher discount rates, 
the fact that the adverse health effects do not appear until later in life may mean that they are not yet 
tangible to our sample of college-age students.11 Differences in the long-term effects of smoking, 
drinking, and obesity are critical as Cutler and Glaeser (2005) ﬁnd that beliefs regarding future 
health effects are important for smoking, but less so for obesity and excessive drinking. Individuals 
who believe smoking to be harmful to their future health are signiﬁcantly less likely to smoke, but 
the same cannot be said of subjects who drink too much or are obese. In other words, if those who 
understand the health effects of smoking either do not start or are successful quitters, then smokers 
in the sample may not believe they are inﬂicting any harm on their future selves. Controlling for 
those smokers who are also heavy drinkers and obese, and likely to have high discount rates, the 
remaining smokers are likely to discount the future at a relatively lower rate. Further, Cutler and 
Glaeser (2005) use data from the Minnesota Twin Registry to show that genetic variation explains 
much more of heavy drinking and obesity than smoking. This suggests that if individuals have an 
inherent tendency toward obesity or drinking, they may believe, at least implicitly, that they are pre­
destined to a relatively short lifetime and make decisions that reﬂect higher discount rates. Smokers, 
on the other hand, smoke from a behavioral preference and clearly do not believe that doing so will 
shorten their lifespan, and make decisions as if their discount rates are correspondingly lower. 
We estimate the various forms of equation (1) using simulated maximum likelihood 
(SML), which is necessary given the random-parameters assumption described above. With this 
speciﬁcation, however, it was not possible to estimate the curvature parameter in the same SML 
routine as the other parameters. Consequently, we adopt a grid-search technique to identify the 
value of α that maximizes the likelihood function conditional on the optimal estimates of the other 
parameters. This approach provides consistent estimates of the curvature parameter, but does not 
allow us to recover standard errors for α without resorting to bootstrapping techniques (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). For the SML routine, we use a Halton draw technique in order to speed convergence 
and ﬁnd that no gains in performance were obtained for draw numbers greater than seventy-ﬁve 
(Train, 2003). 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 summarizes the experimental and demographic behavioral data gathered through the time-
value elicitation exercise. Several features of the data are apparent from this summary. First, the 
behavioral proﬁle of our sample (undergraduate students) differs from that of the general population. 
Although we follow Lusk and Shogren (2007, p. 46) in our belief that “. . . using a student sample 
in a laboratory auction for a study designed to test a theory or behavioral phenomenon is likely 
to be of little concern. . . ”  given  that the theory we test is a general one and “ . . . should hold 
for everyone, including students” (authors’ italics), some parameter estimates may be unique to 
9 BMI is deﬁned as the ratio of weight (in kilograms) to height (in meters) squared. 
10 We also measured smoking as a binary (0 / 1) variable depending on whether the respondent reports any positive number 
of cigarettes smoked per day. This deﬁnition of smoking reﬂects the medical observation that the negative effects of smoking 
occur with even light and intermittent smoking (Schane, Ling, and Glantz, 2010), whereas the negative effects of drinking 
are likely to appear only if the individual is a heavy drinker (Sturm). The results with smoking deﬁned as a binary variable 
are qualitatively similar to those found with a continuous-smoking deﬁnition. 
11 We thank the editor for pointing this out. 
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our sample. Because a student-sample is likely to be younger and from a more highly-educated 
social strata than the average individual in the population, our sample is likely consist of individuals 
who are less obese, less likely to smoke, and, perhaps, drink less than the general population. A 
comparison with a representative national survey conﬁrms our expectations. In fact, 13% of our 
sample are smokers while the smoking rate among adults (> 18 years) in 2010 was 19.3 %. Further, 
deﬁning a "regular drinker” as one who has ﬁve or more drinks per week, we ﬁnd that 28% of our 
sample are regular drinkers, compared to 51% of the general population. With respect to BMI, 56.1% 
of our sample are either overweight (BMI > 25.0) or obese (BMI > 30.0), while 62% of the general 
population have a BMI > 25.0. 
We calculate implied discount rates for each observation (subject / question). The implied 
discount rates are very large for short delays (one day or one week) but they appear to be plausible in 
both magnitude and dispersion among agents relative to other studies. Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter 
(2010), for example, report that discount rates for short delays are very high and decrease in the 
amount of delay and slightly with the magnitude of the amount at stake. On the surface, therefore, 
the subjects in this study appear to exhibit a present-bias. 
In table 2, we report results from a simple linear regression of implied discount rates on variables 
measuring various demographic and behavioral (i.e., smoking, drinking, and obesity) attributes. The 
parameter estimates show that discount rates are higher for older subjects and for males. Whites, 
blacks, Asians, and Hispanics tend to have lower discount rates than those in the “other” category. 
However, marital status, income and household size have no effect on discounting. 
Obesity and drinking have the expected effect on discount rates, that is, those who tend to engage 
in risky behaviors discount the future at a higher rate. Smoking, however, does not have a signiﬁcant 
effect, perhaps because of the competing effects described above or, alternatively, smokers may 
indeed make more risky decisions, the smokers in our sample may simply not be aware of the future 
implications of their behavior (Cutler and Glaeser, 2005). Or, it may be the case that negative health 
effects due to smoking have yet to manifest in our relatively-young sample. On average, these two 
effects counteract each other. It is also conceivable that these summary discount rates may conﬂate 
risk attitudes, quasi-hyperbolic discounting or ﬁxed costs of discounting. 
We control for these other factors that may cloud estimates of pure time-preference by estimating 
the discount function presented in (1). Table 3 presents estimates based on both hyperbolic 
and exponential discount functions, without allowing for risk aversion (r = 1), quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting (or variable-cost of discounting, τ = 0) or a ﬁxed-cost of discounting (β = 0). The 
primary purpose of this model is to establish a benchmark discount rate and estimate the curvature 
parameter in the discount function (α). Using the grid-search procedure described above, the log-
likelihood function is maximized at an α value of 0.704. Therefore, we compare the exponential 
and hyperbolic speciﬁcations, conditional on this estimate, using a likelihood ratio (LR) test with 
one degree of freedom (in the hyperbolic speciﬁcation used here, the exponential is a special case 
where α = 1). We ﬁnd a chi-square LR statistic of 283.32, implying rejection of the exponential 
speciﬁcation. Comparing estimates of the mean value of δ between the exponential and hyperbolic 
models provides some sense of the extent of present-bias that may exist in the data. The value of δ for 
the hyperbolic model is slightly higher than for the exponential, suggesting that subjects’ discount 
rates decline over time (a property of the hyperbolic function) and are generally higher than in the 
estimated exponential model. 
The random parameters speciﬁcation provides estimates of how individual attributes correlate 
with discount rates. Because discount rates vary directly with each element of the zh vector, the 
estimates shown in table 3 are interpreted as marginal impacts on the rate at which subjects discount 
the future. In general, the results in table 3 show that much of the variation in discount rates 
among individuals can be explained by observed heterogeneity, both in demographic and behavioral 
attributes. Comparing speciﬁc parameter estimates among the various econometric models, we note 
that the pattern of effects is similar between the hyperbolic and exponential models and the summary 
evidence provided by the simple OLS regression. Using the hyperbolic estimates for interpretation 
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Table 1: Summary of Experimental Data and Respondent Attributes (N = 82)
 
Amount Delay Units Mean Std. Dev. 
$1.00 1 day $ $0.83 $0.24 
$5.00 1 day $ $3.91 $1.17 
$10.00 1 day $ $8.11 $2.05 
$50.00 1 day $ $40.64 $10.45 
$100.00 1 day $ $83.53 $20.46 
$1.00 7 days $ $0.80 $0.23 
$5.00 7 days $ $3.92 $1.07 
$10.00 7 days $ $7.93 $2.09 
$50.00 7 days $ $39.63 $10.73 
$100.00 7 days $ $81.01 $19.90 
$1.00 1 month $ $0.79 $0.25 
$5.00 1 month $ $3.79 $1.27 
$10.00 1 month $ $7.79 $2.47 
$50.00 1 month $ $36.89 $12.13 
$100.00 1 month $ $77.40 $22.62 
$1.00 6 months $ $0.72 $0.31 
$5.00 6 months $ $3.56 $1.40 
$10.00 6 months $ $7.16 $2.64 
$50.00 6 months $ $36.72 $12.30 
$100.00 6 months $ $75.10 $24.24 
Age Years 23.51 6.50 
% Male % 62.0  49.0 
% White % 73.0  44.0 
% Black % 2.1  15.0 
% Hispanic % 9.0  28.0 
% Asian % 9.0  28.0 
% Married % 13.0  34.0 
Household Size # 1.67 1.20 
Income $ / year $31,737.80 $32,048.90 
% Smoke % 13.0  34.0 
Number of Cigarettes # pk / day 0.63 0.37 
% Drink % 28.0  44.9 
Drink # / week 4.96 10.89 
BMI Index 25.73 4.98 
Notes: BMI is calculated as the ratio of weight (in kg.) divided by the square of height (in cm.). Empirical problems with BMI as a measure of 
obesity are well understood, but it remains the most accepted measure of overweight or obesity in the general population. Time-value pairs are 
drawn from the ﬁrst set of questions; the second set of responses are qualitatively similar and are available from the authors upon request. 
purposes, discount rates tend to be higher for older males of races other than the four major 
classiﬁcations considered in our survey. In terms of the marginal effects, discount rates increase 
0.008 (0.8 of 1%) for every year of age and are fully 29.7% higher for men than women. Given 
that the mean discount rate is 0.727, racial effects are important, in addition to being statistically 
signiﬁcant. Based on the estimates in table 3, relative to the excluded group whites have discount 
rates that are 0.651 lower, for blacks 0.474 lower, Hispanics 1.279 lower, and Asians 0.576 lower. 
Married individuals tend to have discount rates that are 0.192 higher than the mean, while household 
size and income are uncorrelated with time preference.12 The irrelevance of income appears to be 
12 We also tested for non-linear income effects, but found that ﬁt did not improve with either log or quadratic income 
effects. Neither parental education nor GPA were found to be signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations tested. 
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Table 2: OLS Model of Implied Discount Rates
 
Variable Estimate t-ratio 
Constant 0.371 3.317 
Age 0.005∗ 2.220 
Gender 0.082∗ 2.885 
White −0.298∗ −5.694 
Black −0.354∗ −3.530 
Hispanic −0.612∗ −9.160 
Asian −0.248∗ −3.630 
Marital Status 0.040 0.943 
Household Size −0.013 −0.934 
Income −0.006 −0.114 
Smoke Number −0.103 −1.885 
Drink Number 0.006∗ 4.228 
BMI 0.006∗ 2.197 
LLF -1783.785 
R2 0.059 
Notes: δ represents the annualized discount rate. LLF is the log-likelihood function. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood (Train, 
2003). A single asterisk (∗ ) indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level. 
at odds with predictions made by Becker and Mulligan (1997), who suggest that higher wealth is 
associated with lower rates of time preference. 
The relationships between smoking, drinking, obesity, and time preference are of more interest. 
In both models, discount rates tend to rise for heavier drinkers and those who are more obese. Both 
effects are consistent with prior expectations: Individuals who engage in risky health behaviors have 
a lower probability of surviving from one period to the next and should discount the future more 
heavily. Based on the results from the hyperbolic model in table 3, heavy drinkers have discount 
rates that rise 0.017 (1.7%) above the mean for each drink per week, but the estimate for BMI is not 
signiﬁcant. 
Smokers have lower discount rates than non-smokers (0.297 lower for every pack of cigarettes 
per day). Unlike the summary-regression results, the smoking effect is signiﬁcant in the structural 
discounting model. Previous research provides no deﬁnitive priors with respect to the effect of 
smoking on discount rates, it is perhaps surprising that this negative effect is so strong (and consistent 
across all models discussed below). Promises of future tax increases appear to be particularly 
effective in reducing current smoking if smoking is indeed addictive and smokers are forward-
looking. Hence, lower discount rates imply that higher taxes will have an even greater impact than 
previously thought. Moreover, monopolist-cigarette makers will raise prices further as there is little 
incentive to offer lower current prices in order to build larger cohort of addicted smokers (Becker, 
Grossman, and Murphy, 1994). 
In the next model, we relax the assumption of risk neutrality. Andersen et al. (2008) ﬁnd that 
controlling for risk aversion causes estimated discount rates to fall slightly, explaining some of the 
apparent present bias found in previous studies. Table 4 provides estimates of the two discount 
functions while allowing for constant relative risk aversion. Comparing risk-averse speciﬁcations to 
risk-neutral counterparts in table 3, a LR test shows that the risk neutral speciﬁcation is rejected in 
favor of the CRRA model. Controlling for risk aversion, the rate of time preference falls in each 
case, but not as dramatically as in Andersen et al. (2008). Among other parameters, the pattern of 
covariates is very similar to the base-model case so risk aversion is apparently not an inherent trait 
of any of the demographic or behavioral segments described in our survey. It may, however, be the 
case that the present bias is of a form that is not captured by either the hyperbolic or CRRA models. 
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting involves discounting values in future periods at higher rates as if 
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Table 3: Hyperbolic vs. Exponential Model Estimates
 
Hyperbolic Exponential 
Random Parameter Estimate 
δ 0.73∗ 4.46 0.63∗ 3.47 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameter 
σδ 0.74∗ 36.45 0.75∗ 32.74 
Random Parameter Function 
Age 0.01∗ 2.45 −0.00 −0.57 
Gender 0.30∗ 6.99 0.03 0.06 
White −0.65∗ −8.43 −0.55∗ −6.52 
Black −0.47∗ −3.46 −0.29 −1.87 
Hispanic −1.28∗ −12.87 −1.76∗ −15.52 
Asian −0.57∗ −5.54 −0.84∗ −7.38 
Marital Status 0.19∗ 3.10 0.16∗ 2.36 
Household Size 0.01 0.56 0.06∗ 3.21 
Income −0.08 −0.95 0.16 1.89 
Smoke Number −0.30∗ −3.57 −1.12∗ −11.02 
Drink Number 0.02∗ 9.02 0.04∗ 18.55 
BMI 0.01 1.23 0.02∗ 3.48 
Standard Deviation of Model 
σ 0.45∗ 352.36 0.48∗ 361.29 
LLF -1,279.94 -1,421.60 
Notes: δ represents the annualized discount rate. LLF is the log-likelihood function. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood (Train, 
2003). A single asterisk (∗) indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level. 
there were a “variable cost” of discounting—the discount associated with future rewards rises with 
the amount of the reward in a linear way. Table 5 shows the SML estimates of the hyperbolic and 
exponential discounting functions allowing for risk aversion and quasi-hyperbolic (variable cost) 
discounting. Comparing the combined hyperbolic / quasi-hyperbolic model and the exponential / 
quasi-hyperbolic models to the speciﬁcations in table 4 shows a signiﬁcant improvement in ﬁt. 
Moreover, the estimates of τ (the variable cost component) are individually signiﬁcant in both 
the hyperbolic and exponential models. Interestingly, the estimated discount rate increases in the 
hyperbolic model, but decreases in the exponential. Some of the behavior that appeared to be 
consistent with discount rates falling over time, therefore, is more plausibly explained by a positive 
variable cost of discounting. Further, the estimate of r falls in each case when we account for 
hyperbolic discounting. This ﬁnding suggests that imposing a zero variable cost of discounting 
creates a bias against ﬁnding risk aversion. 
Finally, we consider the most general form of the empirical model in equation (1), accounting for 
both a variable and ﬁxed cost of discounting. Comparing the log-likelihood function value of each 
speciﬁcation in table 6 with the speciﬁcations shown in table 5 suggests that the most comprehensive 
model is preferred in both the hyperbolic and exponential cases. In the hyperbolic model, a ﬁxed 
cost of $0.235 is small relative to the size of the values offered in the experiment but nonetheless 
statistically signiﬁcant. While the variable cost estimate is the same as in the restricted model, the 
value of δ is very similar in the hyperbolic case but signiﬁcantly lower in the exponential. This 
ﬁnding suggests that the other plausible explanations for present-bias are as at least partially valid 
and account for some of the effect others attribute to hyperbolic discounting. 
More importantly, parameter estimates are robust to this speciﬁcation. In particular, both obesity 
and drinking are positively related to present-bias. This is an important result. If obesity—and 
excessive drinking—are associated with higher discount rates, then not only are explanations based 
on rational addiction models incorrect, but behavior modiﬁcation efforts that do not address an 
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Table 4: Hyperbolic and Exponential Models: CRRA Form
 
Hyperbolic Exponential 
Fixed Parameter Estimate 
r 0.95∗ 295.74 0.96∗ 280.42 
Random Parameter Estimates 
δ 0.68∗ 4.18 0.59∗ 3.23 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameter 
σδ 0.75∗ 36.83 0.78∗ 34.55 
Random Parameter Function 
Age 0.01∗ 2.45 −0.00 −0.79 
Gender 0.31∗ 7.23 0.01 0.24 
White −0.67∗ −8.69 −0.57∗ −7.00 
Black −0.48∗ −3.83 −1.18∗ −8.69 
Hispanic −1.31∗ −13.03 −1.82∗ −16.59 
Asian −0.59∗ −5.67 −0.88∗ −7.98 
Marital Status 0.20∗ 3.20 0.18∗ 2.59 
Household Size 0.01 0.56 0.07∗ 3.28 
Income −0.08 −0.99 0.16 1.93 
Smoke Number −0.30∗ −3.64 −1.15∗ −11.41 
Drink Number 0.02∗ 8.80 0.04∗ 21.19 
BMI 0.01 1.23 0.02∗ 3.64 
Standard Deviation of Model 
σ 0.45∗ 338.29 0.47∗ 342.28 
LLF -1,257.26 -1,386.13 
Notes: r represents the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, δ represents the annualized discount rate. LLF is the log-likelihood function. 
Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood (Train, 2003). A single asterisk (∗) indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level. 
agent’s need for immediate gratiﬁcation are likely to be ineffective. Policy prescriptions that follow 
from explanations based on the presumption of a rational addiction seek to raise the expected cost 
of future health problems in order to offset higher current beneﬁts from satisfying an addiction. If 
individuals discount the future heavily and discount according to a hyperbolic pattern as suggested 
here, then higher expected future costs will be of little consequence. Further, the smoking results 
notwithstanding, it is likely that this pattern of behavior extends to ﬁnancial decisions, retirement 
planning, career preparation, and even child-raising. Extreme present-bias in each of these cases 
portends more extensive problems than excessive drinking and eating. 
We also test whether the results we report are due to framing effects.13 Table 7 reports results 
obtained by estimating the most general form of the discount function with data from the second set 
of questions, phrased from a future instead of a present-perspective. Using a grid-search technique 
to estimate the curvature parameter, we ﬁnd a value for α of 0.154, which represents a signiﬁcantly 
greater departure from exponential discounting relative to the present-perspective case. This model 
provides a better ﬁt to the data than the exponential model, based on a LR test, indicating that framing 
questions in this way causes discount functions to appear to be “ more hyperbolic.” However, the 
remaining parameters, conditional on this estimate of α , are broadly consistent with the present-
perspective responses. For example, the signs and magnitudes of the obesity effect (as well as the 
smoking and drinking effects) on discount rates are very similar to those obtained using the present-
perspective questions. In the hyperbolic model, estimates of the mean of δ are signiﬁcantly higher 
13 While we test for framing in terms of the present- or future-perspective of the questions, we do not randomize 
dollar values within each session. This is a limitation of our experimental design, but was thought necessary to reduce 
the computational burden on experiment subjects. 
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Table 5: Hyperbolic and Exponential Models: CRRA and Quasi-Hyperbolic Forms
 
Hyperbolic Exponential 
Fixed Parameter Estimate 
τ 0.42∗ 40.70 0.45∗ 43.41 
r 0.87∗ 246.91 0.86∗ 226.17 
Random Parameter Estimates 
δ 0.69∗ 4.87 0.44∗ 2.80 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameter 
σδ 0.68∗ 32.81 0.64∗ 33.76 
Random Parameter Function 
Age 0.01∗ 3.05 0.01∗ 3.56 
Gender 0.30∗ 7.95 0.22∗ 5.39 
White −0.59∗ −8.51 −0.87∗ −12.08 
Black −0.77∗ −6.00 −0.43∗ −2.54 
Hispanic −1.17∗ −12.33 −1.54∗ −15.89 
Asian −0.83∗ −8.67 −1.13∗ −10.83 
Marital Status 0.14∗ 2.67 0.39∗ 6.83 
Household Size 0.04∗ 2.38 0.01 0.48 
Income 0.08 1.19 0.36∗ 4.82 
Smoke Number −1.18∗ −14.21 −0.26∗ −3.14 
Drink Number 0.03∗ 14.15 0.03∗ 17.33 
BMI 0.02∗ 4.39 −0.00∗ −0.17 
Standard Deviation of Model 
σ 0.39∗ 167.58 0.40∗ 163.84 
LLF -976.37 -1059.30 
Notes: τ represents variable cost to discounting, or the quasi-hyperbolic parameter, r represents the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, δ 
represents the annualized discount rate. LLF is the log-likelihood function. Estimation is by simulated maximum likelihood (Train, 2003). A 
single asterisk (∗ ) indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level. 
than the estimates reported in table 6, indicating that framing has no effect on our behavioral ﬁndings 
(smoking, drinking and obesity effects) but appears to have a signiﬁcant effect on discount rate 
estimates. 
Conclusions and Implications 
In this study, we use experimental data to test whether individuals’ time preference decisions 
exhibit present-bias and, if they do, to examine whether the extent of bias is related to personal 
characteristics, including demographic attributes and patterns of behavior that are often regarded as 
pathological. We frame our empirical analysis in a general, nested speciﬁcation in which we test for 
the importance of risk aversion, ﬁxed or variable discounting costs, and hyperbolic discounting in 
generating the appearance of present bias. Resolving the empirical question of whether individual 
agents discount according to a hyperbolic discount schedule is important because many of the critical 
social issues we face today can be attributed to short-term decision making on the part of consumers. 
We ﬁnd that a hyperbolic speciﬁcation that includes both ﬁxed and variable costs of discounting 
and risk aversion provides the best ﬁt to the data. Our discount function is sufﬁciently general to nest 
both the hyperbolic and exponential interpretations and, using nested speciﬁcation testing methods, 
reject the exponential in favor of the hyperbolic model. This is true even after controlling for many 
other factors that may explain present bias. We also ﬁnd a small magnitude effect, meaning that 
discount rates fall in the size of the reward, and a slight framing effect regarding how our time 
Richards and Hamilton Obesity and Hyperbolic Discounting 193 
Table 6: Hyperbolic and Exponential Models: CRRA, Fixed and Variable Cost of Discounting
 
Hyperbolic Exponential 
Fixed Parameter Estimate 
τ 0.42∗ 40.39 0.45∗ 43.42 
r 0.87∗ 242.17 0.86∗ 226.95 
β 0.24∗ 12.05 0.22∗ 10.07 
Random Parameter Estimates 
δ 0.70∗ 4.49 0.63∗ 3.69 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameter 
σδ 0.77∗ 33.72 0.78∗ 33.95 
Random Parameter Function 
Age 0.00 −1.17 0.01 1.53 
Gender 0.52∗ 13.34 0.49∗ 11.42 
White −0.47∗ −6.48 −0.48∗ −6.24 
Black −0.42∗ −3.14 −0.41∗ 2.82 
Hispanic −1.38∗ −14.28 −1.40∗ −14.27 
Asian −1.12∗ −11.01 −1.13∗ −10.70 
Marital Status −0.04 −0.80 −0.06 −0.97 
Household Size 0.12∗ 7.72 0.12∗ 6.50 
Income −0.12 −1.72 −0.14 1.91 
Smoke Number −0.35∗ −4.80 −0.37∗ −4.65 
Drink Number 0.03∗ 13.91 0.03∗ 15.24 
BMI 0.02∗ 5.68 0.02∗ 5.00 
Standard Deviation of Model 
σ 0.39∗ 168.67 0.40∗ 165.16 
LLF -972.34 -1,057.68 
Notes: β represents a ﬁxed cost of discounting, τ represents variable cost to discounting, or the quasi-hyperbolic parameter, r represents the 
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, δ represents the annualized discount rate. LLF is the log-likelihood function. Estimation is by simulated 
maximum likelihood (Train, 2003). A single asterisk (∗ ) indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level. 
preference questions are phrased. Consequently, we conclude that the subjects in our experiment 
discount future costs and beneﬁts according to a modiﬁed hyperbolic process. 
Within the context of this hyperbolic model, we also allow discount rates to vary with a number 
of demographic and behavioral traits. Importantly, we ﬁnd that the more individuals drink, and the 
higher their BMI, the higher their personal discount rates. This is consistent with our expectations 
that less healthy people have a higher hazard rate each period. Interestingly, however, we also ﬁnd 
that smokers have generally lower discount rates, a result that seemingly contradicts the drinking 
and obesity effects, but which may be consistent with the relatively youthful nature of our sample, 
and prior evaluations of how smokers perceive the health effects of their habit. 
If it is indeed the case that obesity and discount rates are positively related, then public 
policy efforts to reduce obesity must target more general behaviors associated with impatience and 
immediate gratiﬁcation and not the usual nutrition education or ﬁtness messages that are currently 
being developed. Moreover, although taxes raise current prices and reduce current consumption, 
taxing foods deemed to be unhealthy is intended to raise consumers’ expectations of future prices. 
"Rational addicts" in the sense of Becker and Murphy (1988) who discount the future lightly will 
signiﬁcantly reduce current consumption if they expect future prices to be higher as a result of 
the tax. Consumers who discount heavily, or even in a manner consistent with quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting, will be less likely to change their consumption because the future costs mean less to 
them than to other, exponentially-discounting addicts. 
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Table 7: Hyperbolic and Exponential Models: CRRA, Fixed and Variable Cost of Discounting
 
Hyperbolic Exponential 
Fixed Parameter Estimates 
τ 0.21∗ 6.68 0.41∗ 38.61 
r 0.78∗ 256.64 0.78∗ 172.74 
β 0.18∗ 34.82 0.13∗ 12.89 
Random Parameter Estimates 
δ 1.07∗ 7.96 0.50∗ 2.33 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameter 
σδ 0.62∗ 33.82 0.94∗ 39.05 
Random Parameter Function 
Age −0.03∗ −15.31 −0.04∗ −12.57 
Gender −0.03 −1.12 0.10 1.72 
White 0.46∗ 8.31 0.46∗ 4.38 
Black −1.01∗ −7.91 −0.52∗ −2.59 
Hispanic −0.13 −1.70 −0.23 −1.67 
Asian 0.84∗ 10.90 0.67∗ 4.79 
Marital Status 0.06 1.06 −0.07 −0.87 
Household Size −0.06∗ −3.62 −0.03 −0.92 
Income −0.01∗ −0.19 −0.15 −1.49 
Smoke Number −1.10∗ −13.94 −0.42∗ −3.73 
Drink Number 0.01∗ 7.59 0.01∗ 4.03 
BMI 0.03∗ 9.15 0.04∗ 8.17 
Standard Deviation of Model 
σ 0.49∗ 141.89 0.58 213.23 
LLF -1,417.52 -1,822.60 
Notes: β represents a ﬁxed cost of discounting, τ represents variable cost to discounting, or the quasi-hyperbolic parameter, r represents the 
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, δ represents the annualized discount rate. LLF is the log-likelihood function. Estimation is by simulated 
maximum likelihood (Train, 2003). A single asterisk (∗ ) indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level. 
Future research in this area should consider larger, more diverse samples that include subjects 
with a greater range of behaviors. Second, in terms of the time preference experiment, Andersen et al. 
(2008) argue that much of the evidence for hyperbolic discounting is due, in fact, to the existence 
of a front end delay. Phrasing the reward-time pairs such that no immediate reward is available 
would allow a test of their hypothesis in settings other than their Norwegian experiment. Finally, 
more theoretical research on why individuals may appear to follow hyperbolic discount functions 
would be helpful. Currently, most of the work in this area is empirical and the econometric models 
not grounded in theory. Devising theoretical models of hyperbolic discounting that can be tested 
directly is the next logical step for this research. 
[Received June 2009; ﬁnal revision received March 2012.] 
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Appendix A: Experimental Procedures
 
In this appendix, we provide additional details on our experimental procedure (a more complete 
version is available upon request). Our sample consisted of eighty-two members of a 400-level 
management class at Arizona State University. All participants were familiar with the concept of 
“time value of money” so the conceptual explanation was kept to a minimum. All auction procedures 
are carried out using pen-and-paper responses and the data were entered into an Excel spreadsheet 
for preparation for further statistical analysis. 
On the day of the auction, the experiment consisted of seven steps. Each of the seven steps are 
described below: 
Step 1: In step 1, each participant was asked to sit and not discuss the experimental procedure 
with anyone else in the room. All subjects were then shown a Powerpoint presentation introducing 
and motivating the nature of the experiment, which was also narrated by the experimenter. Next, 
we brieﬂy described the subject matter of the experiment and explained that we intended to 
measure each student’s personal discount rate. They were told that their participation was completely 
voluntary and that they had the option to leave at any time. 
Step 2: In step 2, participants were introduced to the time-value elicitation procedure. Using 
a second part of the Powerpoint presentation, we explained how the BDM mechanism works and 
provided an intuitive explanation of why it is incentive-compatible. All participants were told that 
one round per part of the experiment (Part I = Present Value, Part II = Future Value) would be chosen 
at random to be binding, and that they were to pick up their payment after the session was complete 
and they had signed their payment receipt. 
Step 3: Once the BDM mechanism had been explained carefully, we went through a simple 
example involving the choice between $1.00 one year in the future and an amount today (similar to 
Part I). Once we were conﬁdent that all the participants understood how the experiment was to be 
conducted and answered any questions they had, we conducted a second practice session, offering 
$1.00 today and an amount of their choosing one year in the future (similar to Part II). 
Step 4: After completing the practice round, the participants were then instructed that we would 
begin the experiment. Because all time-values are individual-speciﬁc, there is no need to deﬁne 
treatment and control groups as in a more conventional auction setting. Participants were instructed 
to complete Part I of the experiment and were reminded that it was similar to the ﬁrst practice round. 
Once all subjects had completed Part I, we then instructed them to move on to Part II, and reminded 
them that it was similar to the second practice round. 
Step 5: After all subjects had completed both Part I and Part II, they were asked to complete the 
demographic / behavioral survey and to return their completed instrument to the experimenter (see 
the instrument below). 
Step 6: Once the surveys were all completed, each participant was instructed to leave the room 
and enter the adjoining room to receive their payment and to sign the payment receipt form. The 
rounds chosen to determine payment were $5.00 in one week for Part I and $10.00 in four weeks for 
Part II. 
Step 7: The ﬁnal step involves recording and analyzing the bid and survey data. 
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
 
A summary of the instruments used to elicit time-value preferences and demographic information is 
provided below (more detailed versions are available upon request). 
Demographic Section 
The ﬁrst section of the survey consisted of a set of demographic questions designed to gather data 
on subject age, gender, race, major, income and, most importantly, self-reported metrics for weight, 
height, as well as smoking and drinking behaviors. 
Time Value Elicitation Section 
The second section consisted of the time-value elicitation questions. The ﬁrst part of this section 
presented the questions from a present-value perspective, while the second did so from a future-
value perspective. In the present-value part, we presented each subject with text that explained how 
". . . we  will ask a number of questions regarding how much you would take right now (in dollars) 
to be equally satisﬁed with (or indifferent between) this amount and some other amount to be paid 
in the future. We will vary the future amounts over ﬁve values ($1.00 to $100.00) and the length 
of time in which you would have to wait (one day to one year). To ensure that it is in your best 
interests to report your bids accurately, we will choose one combination of values and time periods 
and announce a random value between $0 and the future amount to be paid. If your bid is less than 
this random value, we will pay you that amount immediately, but if it is more than the random value, 
we will pay you your bid after the stated period of time. . . "  
We then followed with ﬁve sets of ﬁve questions each in which we asked each subject to "Please 
enter your indifference amount in the blank following the $ sign in the questions below.” Each 
question in each block then asks "What amount of money, $ , if paid to you today would leave 
you equally satisﬁed with being paid $1.00 ($5.00, $10.00, $50.00 or $100.00) in one day (one week, 
four weeks, six months, one year)? 
In the future-value part, we offered a similar set of instructions and followed with another ﬁve 
blocks of questions written as: "What amount of money would you require to leave you equally 
satisﬁed with receiving $1.00 ($5.00, $10.00, $50.00, $100.00) today and $ in one day (one 
week, four weeks, six months, one year)? 
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